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Abstract
The trend towards self-organization of systems like peer-to-peer or ad hoc networks generates increasing
needs for designing distributed storage schemes that should themselves be self-organized and cooperative.
Unfortunately, in such systems, the data stored are exposed to new disruption attacks either because of
the selﬁshness of participating nodes with respect to their resources or even because self-organization that
leaves such systems much more subject to maliciousness. This setting, combined with the high churnout
of nodes and with the high chances of network partition, particularly in mobile ad hoc systems, makes it
quite uneasy to ensure the long-term availability of data stored in such fashion. This paper discusses a
veriﬁcation framework based on the probabilistic assessment of small cryptographic veriﬁcations in order to
assess storage and to prevent data destruction. A protocol for determining the availability of data stored in
an ad hoc fashion is detailed. The design of a reputation system based on this protocol and inciting nodes
to cooperate towards storage is then discussed.
Keywords: self-organizing networks, ad hoc storage, storage availability, cooperation, selﬁshness.
1 Introduction
The development of ad hoc networks able to run in adverse environments like ac-
cident scenes or battleﬁelds generates tremendous requirements in terms of archi-
tectural self-organization. Routing has for instance been vastly explored in the
literature. The applications of ad hoc storage are spurring the development of ap-
propriate schemes in this ﬁeld. Storage applications, which are most prominent in
the P2P world with ﬁle sharing providing a short-term storage service, typically al-
low ad hoc nodes to communicate even when coordination between nodes is hardly
feasible: in particular, locally produced content may be distributed and may beneﬁt
from the storage space available in the immediate vicinity of a node. In unstable
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environments like ad hoc networks, distributed storage may contribute to achieving
more dependable and secure applications through the provision of backup services
[3] and [8], crash-tolerant blackboards inspired by desktop teleporting [1], or even
contextual and location-aware services [10].
In comparison with P2P architectures, achieving secure and trusted ad hoc stor-
age presents a particular challenge due to the open, autonomous, and highly dy-
namic nature of ad hoc networks. In particular, it should be anticipated that nodes
will leave data behind them because their connection capabilities may be quite
ephemeral or because the mobility model of the application is such that nodes are
frequently joining and leaving the network; nevertheless, the applications discussed
above necessitate the data stored in some ”location” or distributed among a set of
holder nodes to be protected from destruction as long as necessary. We argue that
any eﬀort to protect the storage system should ensure the following goals:
• Conﬁdentiality and integrity of data: most of storage applications deal with
personal (or group) data that is stored somewhere in the network at generally un-
trusted nodes. That’s why data must be protected while it is transmitted between
intermediary nodes and while it is stored at the destination node. Typically, con-
ﬁdentiality and integrity of stored data is ensured using common cryptographic
means such as encryption methods and checksums.
• Anonymity: anonymity can refer to the data owner identity, the data holder
identity, or the interaction details operated between them. Anonymity avoids
attacks where the attacker targets all holders of a given data, thus extinguishing
data from the whole system. Systems that seek to provide anonymity often
employ infrastructures for providing anonymous connection layers, e.g., onion
routing [7].
• Identiﬁcation: within a distributed environment like P2P or mobile ad hoc
networks, it is possible for the same physical entity to appear under diﬀerent
identities, particularly in systems with highly transient populations of nodes.
This problem may lead to attacks called ”Sybil attacks” [5], and may threaten as
well mechanisms such as data replication that rely on the existence of independent
peers with diﬀerent identities. Solutions to these attacks are the deployment of
a central certiﬁcation authority or more likely in an ad hoc network, limiting the
acceptable operations if the connection of too many ephemeral and untrustworthy
identities is observed. This objective may limit anonymity.
• Access control: the lack of authentication can be overcome by the distribution
of the keys necessary for accessing the stored data to a subset of privileged nodes.
Access control lists can also be assigned to data by their original owners through
the use of signed certiﬁcates.
• Long-term data survivability: the durability of storage in some applications
like backup is very critical. The system must ensure that the data will be per-
manently conserved (until its retrieval by the owner node). Techniques such as
data replication or erasure codes improve the durability of data conservation, but
these techniques must be regularly adjusted to optimize the capacity of the sys-
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tem. Generally, the employed adaptation method is based on frequent checks over
the stored data to test whether the very data is still held by the expected holder
node. Moreover, cooperation incentive techniques must be used to encourage
holder nodes to preserve the data they store as long as they are able to.
• Data availability: any storage system must ensure that the stored data is
accessible and useable upon demand by an authorized node. Data checks at
holder nodes allow the regular veriﬁcation of this property, and at the same time
inspecting the route (connectivity) between the owner node and the holder node.
We concentrate in this paper on the last two objectives above: high availability
and long-term durability of data storage in the context of a mobile ad hoc environ-
ment. These two objectives are often ignored in P2P ﬁle sharing applications which
rather follow best eﬀort approaches. This paper suggests that performing periodic
cryptographic veriﬁcations should enable the probabilistic evaluation of the avail-
ability of data stored in the system. Such storage evaluation enables the design of a
cooperation enforcement framework; contrary to ad hoc routing cooperation where
the result of packet forwarding can be observed immediately, such a system requires
crafting a long-term evaluation scheme adapted to the peculiarities of the ad hoc
network, which feature frequent connectivity disruptions.
This paper’s contribution is threefold: an architecture for verifying ad hoc stor-
age that overcomes the connectivity issues of ad hoc networks is ﬁrst introduced.
Second, a new veriﬁcation protocol of data possession is described that ﬁts the re-
quirements of the framework. Finally, the use of storage veriﬁcation for building
a reputation system for discriminating well-behaved nodes from malicious ones is
discussed.
2 An Architecture Enabling Ad Hoc Storage Veriﬁca-
tion
This section describes the architecture of the storage framework designed for ad
hoc networks , and in particular how veriﬁcations can be implemented. A typical
multi-hop mobile ad hoc network consists of mobile nodes which communicate with
each other through multiple routes. The storage application allows a data owner
node to select a given holder node in its vicinity and to send it the data to store
once the holder has agreed to store the data. It is likely that the owner node will
repeat this operation for the same data at several holders, with the aim of fostering
data availability by replication. The application should permit the owner node to
periodically verify if the holder node still possesses the data it has pledged to store,
the veriﬁcation consisting in a challenge-response protocol between the owner node
and the holder node (see Section 3). Intermediary nodes on the route between the
two nodes may as well verify the holder response, thereby making it possible for
them to evaluate the behavior of the holder node, and to get a rough idea of the
trustworthiness of the holder by themselves even if they do not store data at this
node.
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In addition to having constrained resources, mobile devices operate in an adverse
environment where end-to-end connectivity is highly susceptible to various disrup-
tions, especially so if the owner frequently joins and leaves the network. To cope
with such issues, the owner can delegate storage veriﬁcations to other mobile nodes
it trusts. While any trusted node may perform storage veriﬁcations, we suggest
the use of dedicated nodes may make sense. The concept of ”throwbox” [13] has
been suggested to improve the connectivity of an ad hoc network in a DTN fashion.
Throwboxes normally relay data between nodes using a ”store-carry-and-forward”
paradigm. They have storage capability and they are easy to deploy in the ﬁeld
without access to any infrastructure. More complex versions of such relay nodes
based on overlays have even been proposed [12]. We propose that throwboxes be-
longing to trusted authorities may carry out storage veriﬁcations on behalf of the
owner node, thus improving the long-term availability of data storage in the region
around a throwbox instead of restricting veriﬁcations to when the owner node is
connected only. Throwboxes would not have to store data, but rather security meta-
data (who stores which owner data, and proofs of delegation) making it possible to
perform periodic data storage veriﬁcations. They may also be in charge of repli-
cating data as they would see ﬁt based on the evaluation of security (see Fig.1 for
examples). Thus, veriﬁcation not only makes it possible to assess the cooperation of
holders with respect to the storage application, but also to react to data destruction
by increasing the number of replicas in the network. Throwboxes may also make it
possible to cope with situations where the owner and holders are regularly, but not
simultaneously reconnected to the network.
3 Veriﬁcation Protocol
This section ﬁrst discusses the properties that the protocol must satisfy to verify
correctly and eﬃciently that a node still possesses some data at the time of challenge.
A new protocol that allows a node to probabilistically verify, using a key and based
on challenge-response messages, whether a data holder node still possesses the data
it agreed to store for the originator node is then introduced.
3.1 Properties
In the following we deﬁne the properties of the veriﬁcation protocol that meets the
expectations of the veriﬁcation framework presented earlier:
• Soundness: if data is destroyed by the holder node, the latter cannot prove it
is storing data to the veriﬁer except with a negligible probability.
• Completeness: if both the veriﬁer and the holder are honest and they correctly
follow the proposed protocol, the veriﬁer always accepts the proof of the holder
as valid.
• Eligibility: a challenge should only be sent by the owner or the nodes that
possess a certiﬁcate signed by the owner. The eligibility property is required to
prevent denial of service (DoS) attacks, e.g., ﬂooding of the holder node with
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Fig. 1. Scenarios: (a) the owner node no1 can communicate with the holder node no4 to perform veriﬁca-
tions, (b) the owner node cannot communicate with the holder node, the throwbox performs veriﬁcation on
behalf of the owner node, (c) the holder node delegates storage to another node no5, and (d) the throwbox
detects storage default at the new holder node, and informs neighboring nodes. It would then trigger a new
replication as if it were the owner.
challenges.
• Veriﬁability: any node that knows the challenge and its response can verify the
correctness of the response. This property allows improving the way in which
trustworthiness is assessed in the system, by taking advantage of the multi-hop
routing architecture.
• Eﬃciency: the protocol impact should be as low as possible, especially so if
devices have scarce resources.
Protocols for the veriﬁcation of data possession have been mostly studied within
P2P systems, in which data storage and backup have been addressed in a distributed
and self-organized fashion. Two families of protocols should be distinguished: the
ﬁrst one (e.g., [9] and [2]) relies on the veriﬁcation of some data sent by the holder
against the original data kept by its original owner, while the second one (e.g., [4]
and [6]) is based on the veriﬁcation of a proof generated on demand (when receiving
a challenge) from the data. The former category has been most used for backup
applications, since data are preserved at the originator until a crash happens, while
the latter one better addresses distributed storage applications in general. A list of
existing veriﬁcation protocols is presented in Table.1. The protocol proposed in this
paper pertains to the second category yet it does not require the veriﬁer to perform
time-consuming computations to answer challenges because of the small size of the
data chunks veriﬁed, contrary to [4] or [6]. The protocol also does not require the
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veriﬁer to keep data nor pre-computed challenges.
Lillibridge et
Al. [9]
Caronni and
Waldvogel [2]
Deswarte et
Al. [4]: Hash
solution
Deswarte et
Al. [4]: RSA
solution
Filho and
Barreto [6]
Soundness Yes Yes Yes (limited
by the num-
ber of chal-
lenges)
Yes Yes
Completeness Yes Yes Yes (limited
by the num-
ber of chal-
lenges)
Yes Yes
Eligibility Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Veriﬁability No No No No No
Eﬃciency
Data stored
at veriﬁer
Simple
comparison
Data stored
at veriﬁer
MAC
computation
Pre-
computed
challenges
Hash
computation
A hash of
data is stored
at veriﬁer
Data as an
RSA
exponent
A hash of
data is stored
at veriﬁer
Data as an
RSA
exponent
Table 1
Storage veriﬁcation protocols
3.2 Probabilistic veriﬁcation Protocol
We assume that a node stores its data onto other nodes it encounters. In order to
ensure that nodes preserve these data in their storage space, they are periodically
challenged to prove they still have them at hand. The challenge periodicity should
be ﬁxed based on network and nodes speciﬁc performances, in particular in order
to avoid attacks such as ﬂooding by excessive challenging (see discussion below in
Section 3.3). The players in the system envisioned are denoted as follows:
• O denotes the data originator or owner.
• H denotes the data holder which stores O’s data.
• V denotes the veriﬁer: it can be O, or a delegate of O. We will concentrate on O
as a veriﬁer.
• P denotes the data prover, which answers challenges. The veriﬁcation should
prove that P is H or a registered delegate. We will address only the case P = H.
The veriﬁcation protocol requires asymmetric pairs of cryptographic pub-
lic/private keys (we name them veriﬁcation keys) owned by participating nodes.
Private keys are kept secret, while public keys are widely distributed. The protocol
comprises the following two phases (see Fig.2):
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Setup phase: O splits the data, termed M , into n segments, {mi}1≤i≤n. O signs
each segment, along with its index, using the veriﬁcation keys. The result is the
set {SignO(mi, i, O)}1≤i≤n. (SignU (m) means signature of message m by the
private key of U). Then, O sends {mi, SignO(mi, i, O)}1≤i≤n to H for storage.
Veriﬁcation phase: V randomly chooses a value j in [1, n]. It generates a times-
tamp T , signs it, and then concatenates it to the index j (the timestamp prevents
challenge denials of service using message replay). V sends the challenge message
to P . P veriﬁes the freshness of T and responds with the corresponding couple
(mj , SignO(mj , j, O)) together with a signed T : the timestamp is used to prevent
a man-in-the-middle attack replaying an old response and destined to denigrate
H by pretending it is not storing the requested mj . V veriﬁes if the signatures in
the returned response are all valid.
Setup phase
(i) O → H : mi, SignO(mi, i, O)1≤i≤n
Veriﬁcation phase
(i) V chooses a random value index j in [1, n]
(ii) V → P : O, j, T, SignV (O, j, T )
(iii) V veriﬁes SignV (O, j, T )
(iv) P → V : mj , SignO(mj , j, O), T, SignP (mj , SignO(mj , j, O), T )
(v) V veriﬁes SignP (mj , SignO(mj , j, O), T ) and SignO(mj , j, O)
Fig. 2. Probabilistic veriﬁcation protocol, with V = O and P = H
In this protocol, P proves that it is keeping a data segment for O, and gives some
evidence of its origin and its integrity. The veriﬁcation process requires computa-
tional resources consumed at V , and additional storage space together with some
computation at P . The extra storage at P is the price to pay for a veriﬁcation
process without data, or pre-computed information stored at V . Keys do not need
to be stored by V if they can be generated based on a passphrase for instance. Such
an approach, or the use of a token, would be required for a storage application in
O may have completely crashed, thereby losing any secret stored there.
The proposed protocol veriﬁes the completeness property because if the correct
answer of P to a challenge suﬃces V to be convinced that H is keeping all data.
Regarding the soundness property, if H destroys the data or a portion of the data,
P cannot answer challenges sent by V with high probability (this is analyzed in the
following subsection). H answer challenges for a speciﬁc data just only from eligible
nodes: the data owner O and owner delegates including throwboxes, denoted V . In
the protocol, the timestamp concatenated to the challenge message guarantees that
the message is sent by O. For a delegate, the challenge message must comprise in
addition to the signed timestamp a certiﬁcate proving the legitimacy of the veriﬁer as
a delegate in the form of CertO(O,PKV , validity), signed by O. Also considering
the veriﬁability property, any node that has knowledge of the respective public
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keys of P and V , can verify the correctness of the response for a given challenge.
Finally, the probabilistic aspect of the protocol allows to trade oﬀ some security
with performance (small communication overhead). The protocol does not require
storage at V and the veriﬁcation process is much less expensive than verifying the
whole data at once.
3.3 Security analysis
In this section, we study the security of the veriﬁcation protocol: ﬁrstly by exam-
ining the probabilistic approach suggested by the protocol, and then by looking to
some additional prominent attacks and their respective solutions.
3.3.1 Probabilistic assessment
In the proposed protocol, if the result of the veriﬁcation performed at step (5) is
true, then V is probabilistically assured that P still holds data. By each veriﬁcation,
V checks that P holds the segment mj . Since j is chosen randomly, P has to keep
all segments and their signatures {mi, SignO(mi, i, O)}1≤i≤n to answer correctly to
all challenges, unless it takes chances to revealed as an attacker at some point in
time. This subsection discusses how secure is such a probabilistic veriﬁcation. We
are making the following assumptions:
• V ’s random selection of indexes is uniform, i.e., the probability to pick any seg-
ment is 1/n.
• Index selections are independent events.
• P removes a data segment with a uniform probability d from its storage. The
probability d is the same for all segments and it is referred to as the misbehavior
rate of P .
• V performs c challenges where 1 ≤ c ≤ n.
The probability that V detects P ’s misbehavior is given by pdetection:
pdetection = 1− (1− d)c
For a given probability of detection of misbehavior, it is possible to probabilis-
tically determine the average number of challenges that V should perform to attain
this probability. The number of challenges c can be derived as follows:
c = log1−d(1− pdetection)
The required number of challenges to acquire a given probability of detection
is most of the time not equal to 1 (see Fig.3). Therefore, the message challenge of
V must consist of not only just one index, but c indexes. The appropriate value
for c can be chosen based on the misbehavior rate of P estimated thanks to P ’s
reputation (see Section 4). Also, the given probability of detection can be ﬁne-tuned
with respect to the criticality of the stored data: a very critical data (respectively
an ordinary data) implies a high value (respectively a low value) for pdetection.
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Fig. 3. Number of challenges required to achieve a probability of detection of P’s misbehavior
3.3.2 Countering additional attacks
The described veriﬁcation protocol permits to detect selﬁsh holders that destroy
the data they have promised to store. However, the protocol alone is not able
to defend against other forms of misbehavior, such as denial of service attacks,
proxying attacks, or colluding replica holders. A ﬂooding attack can be launched
by the veriﬁer, by sending a large number of challenge messages to a victim data
holder in order to slow it until it is unusable or crashes. Although this type of attack
is unlikely to happen since the veriﬁer performs computational operations for every
challenge, it is possible to limit the number of challenges by imposing a quota on
the frequency of challenges. This solution is proposed in [9]. Moreover, it is possible
to force the veriﬁer to pay fees for every challenge it requests, for instance using a
micropayment scheme. An alternative approach is to reciprocate in storing data,
thereby performing symmetric veriﬁcations between the two nodes, like in [2].
A holder can pretend to be storing data while in fact proxying in front of another
data holder. Then, the attacker simply passes data back and forth between the
originator and the holder, making the data originator believe that it is the data
holder, and the data holder that it is the originator of the data. This problem can
be addressed by having the index j for each challenge randomly chosen by both
parties as suggested in the random-read protocol presented in [9] in which both
parties randomly choose the oﬀset of the block to be checked.
When using replication mechanisms to support the availability of data, replica
holders may collude so that only one of them stores data, thereby defeating the pur-
pose of replication to their sole proﬁt. One way to counter this attack is to produce
personalized replicas for each holder, as described in [2], by using an encryption key
(used to encrypt the data) derived from the identity of the holder. Responses to
a challenge are constructed such that SignO(mi, i, O, IDP ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. When
veriﬁcation of data is managed solely by a throwbox, this throwbox can construct
new personalized replicas based on its own signature (these replicas will comprise
as well the previous signature of the owner node). Similar mechanisms should be
crafted, for instance based on an identity strongly linked with the reputation and
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that may be a SPKI like cryptographic key provided by an oﬄine trusted third
party (TTP).
4 Cooperation Incentives
Participating nodes have distinct strategies, and may in particular try to save their
energy or storage space. In particular, a node may try to proﬁt from the storage
system without contributing to it in a ”free-riding” fashion. To counter such be-
havior, we follow the trend set by P2P ﬁle sharing applications, and suggest using
cooperation incentives. Nodes in the system compute the reputation of other nodes
based on the results of the veriﬁcation process performed over the data stored by
the holder node. This reputation is then used to decide on the storage policy to-
wards assessed nodes. Reputation computation may be based on direct interaction
or indirect observation of storage veriﬁcations by intermediary nodes that do not
challenge the data holder. However in the latter case, nodes may collude in order
to increase their reputation: a request may be sent over a multi-hop link for which
the pretending holder has a predeﬁned answer. Intermediate nodes should therefore
give less weight to the interpretation of such results than of those resulting from
their own interactions. For instance, they can assign a lower weight to nodes al-
ways recommended by the same owner node, or by nodes with a low reputation.
Reputation should also slowly decrease if no veriﬁcation has been witnessed by the
computing node: this prevents nodes with good reputation from stopping their con-
tribution to storage operations while enjoying the beneﬁts of cooperative storage.
Considering the assumption used above that a selﬁsh holder node destroys data
Fig. 4. Reacting to the detection of a storage default
with a probability d, the destruction of data will be detected on average after 1/d
veriﬁcation operations. Therefore after n veriﬁcation operations that have produced
correct responses, the veriﬁer is probabilistically sure that the rate of destruction
by the data holder is lower than 1/(n + 1). For every veriﬁcation operation per-
formed against the holder, the veriﬁer therefore can reevaluate the probability of
destruction d ≈ 1/(n + 1) which corresponds to reevaluating the reputation of the
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holder and the required number c of indexes per challenge round. Since they are
considered as less reliable, poorly famed nodes do not require as many challenges to
be deemed dependable according to the standards of their reputation. In contrast,
well famed nodes should be further challenged up to a chosen threshold that deter-
mines the performance penalty the owner is ready to pay in terms of veriﬁcation
overhead. Whenever the veriﬁer detects that the holder node has destroyed some
data, it reduces the reputation of the latter to zero. This severe policy against
selﬁsh nodes may be unfair for holder nodes that have lost data because of a crash
or faults. Therefore, we suggest the use of a grace period (e.g., one day) for the
holder node to prove its conformance.
The reputation system also guides nodes in choosing the best strategy for stor-
ing their data. For instance, one’s critical data should rather be stored at a good
reputation node if one is available around. Verifying the data stored at some holder
thus enables estimating its reputation which in turn helps choose the right holders.
Fig.5 depicts the feedback loop taking place after data destruction is detected, and
illustrates the correlation between storage veriﬁcation, reputation estimation, and
storage strategy. The use of the veriﬁcation protocol as a building block for cooper-
ation incentives has been validated in [11] using game theory (even though this work
assumes a remuneration based instead of reputation based incentive scheme). With
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challenges
time, the reputation of a cooperative node increases; the reputation of selﬁsh node
ﬂuctuates between 0 and (1− d). Every node in the system must have a history of
some nodes whenever the reputation of these nodes nulliﬁes, in order to detect these
ﬂuctuations and conclude that these nodes are selﬁsh and must be blacklisted. The
measured reputation is bounded between 0 and 1. We denote the reputation of the
holder P at time t, RP (t). After a positive veriﬁcation operation, the reputation is
re-estimated as it follows:
[RP (t)]new = 1/(2− [RP (t)]old)
Fig.5 illustrates the reputations variations for three types of nodes: a coopera-
tive node, a selﬁsh node with probability of destruction d = 0.1, and a selﬁsh node
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with d = 0.5. The cooperative node sees its reputation increasing asymptotically
approximating a reputation equal to 1. The selﬁsh node with d = 0.1 has a reputa-
tion ﬂuctuating between 0 and 0.9.These ﬂuctuations becomes more important for
the selﬁsh node with d = 0.5.
5 Conclusion
We described how storage may be enabled through cooperation in ad hoc networks.
Securing such an application requires at least enforcing cooperation, hence assessing
it ﬁrst. This paper details a cryptographic protocol that may be used to prove that
some data are still in the possession of the node supposed to store it. This proba-
bilistic challenge-response protocol aims at detecting misbehaving nodes attacking
the cooperative storage scheme in a less expensive manner than cryptographic ap-
proaches in the literature. The protocol also does not require veriﬁers to store the
original data, which are entirely kept by the prover, so that the veriﬁcation process
may be delegated to trusted nodes. We ﬁnally discuss how to build reputation in-
centives based on the results of storage veriﬁcation for punishing ill behaved nodes
and for increasing storage dependability and durability. We are currently devel-
oping alternative veriﬁcation techniques and plan to investigate the performance
requirements of our scheme in particular with respect to cryptographic veriﬁcation
primitives.
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